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Abstract 
Grounded in the main theoretical approaches to the study of electoral volatility, this article 
examines cross-regional variations in the levels of volatility for UR in Duma elections over the 
period 2003-2016 which are juxtaposed with the level of volatility for the Kremlin’s candidates in 
presidential elections. The main finding is that “regime-type” or more precisely “authoritarianism” 
is the key explanatory variable. Stronger authoritarian rulers are able to control regional elites and 
ensure the best results for UR by exerting administrative pressure on the voters. This reduces the 
level of volatility in support for UR. At the same time, economic and institutional explanations 
have a partial significance. Here, Duma elections differ from presidential elections which 
demonstrate a much lower degree of volatility and insignificance of economic factors. 
Key words: elections, United Russia, cross-regional variations, volatility 
Introduction 
For Powell and Tucker note, volatility is especially important, because it is ‘linked to one of the 
most fundamental issues in political science, namely stability’ (2013, p. 123). As Mainwaring and 
Zoco stress, ‘the level of uncertainty about who will govern and what kind of government and 
policies are likely, is attenuated with a stable party system and heightened with high volatility’ 
(2007, p. 157). In systems with high levels of volatility, ‘parties that were electorally significant 
in one election get crushed in the next, while new parties emerge. Thus, citizens are less likely to 
be able to identify what the parties are, and where they stand, with adverse consequences for 
programmatic representation’ (Ibid). Moreover, as Birch observes, high levels of volatility 
‘reduces accountability – voters cannot “throw the rascals out” if the rascals no longer exist as a 
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unified group’(2003, p. 120), and it thwarts the institutionalization of parties ‘by decreasing the 
level of long term commitment which politicians, activists, and voters have to their party’ (Ibid). 
In this study we examine cross-regional volatility in the electoral support for the Kremlin’s 
“party of power”, United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya, UR). Our study examines the volatility of 
support for UR over the period 2013-16, which includes all four of the Duma elections (2003, 
2007, 2011 and 2016), since the party was formed in 2001. Whilst the Russian party system was 
highly fragmented and volatile during the Yeltsin era (1991-2000), by the middle of the 2000s an 
electoral authoritarian regime had been established under Putin, and the Kremlin’s “party of 
power”, United Russia (UR) had emerged as the dominant party (see Gel’man 2006, Reuter 2010, 
Reuter and Remington 2009, Ross 2011, Ross 2011a). In 2003, 2007 and 2016 UR won over two 
thirds of the seats in the Duma (a constitutional majority), and it gained a majority of the seats in 
2011. Likewise, UR gained control over almost all of the regional assemblies, and the vast majority 
of regional governors are members of the party.  
However, these impressive national level victories for UR mask important variations in the 
levels of support for the party at the regional level. Whilst the Putin administration has attempted 
to impose a power vertical in the country, there still remain important regional variations in 
electoral and party politics and in the types of political regimes which operate in the regions, which 
range from “competitive” to “hegemonic” authoritarian (Panov and Ross 2013). These variations 
in the type of polity have impacted on the electoral support for UR which is much higher in the 
more authoritarian regimes. Whilst there have been a number of studies which have examined 
cross-regional variations in electoral support for United Russia (Clem 2006; Marsh, Albert and 
Warhola 2004; Reisinger and Moraski 2009; Reisinger and Moraski 2010; White 2015), the study 
of regional variations in the volatility of voting for UR has not yet been addressed.  
Following Pedersen (1983), we define ‘electoral volatility’ as changes in the levels of 
electoral support for UR between electoral cycles, which is calculated by ‘adding the absolute 
value of change in the percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the 
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next, then dividing by two’ (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 158). In this study we examine electoral 
volatility in support for UR not for the Russian party system as a whole.  
In addition to our study of Duma elections we also examine cross-regional variation in the 
volatility of electoral support for the Kremlin’s presidential candidates in the 2004, 2008 and 2012 
campaigns. The juxtaposition of voting patterns in both types of elections will enable us to tease 
out some of the special features of UR’s electoral support in the Duma elections. Although UR 
nominated candidates for the presidency (Putin in 2004 and 2012, and Medvedev in 2008), it is 
important to point out that these nominations came under the control of the Kremlin rather than 
the party. Moreover, we also need to take account of the fact that voting in presidential races are  
usually based more on the personal attributes of the candidates, than on their party affiliations.  
We begin our paper with a brief review of cross-regional differences in voting for UR / 
UR-Kremlin candidates and volatility in their support across the regions. Then we turn to a 
discussion of the key theoretical approaches to the study of volatility in democracies and 
authoritarian regimes, which we argue have not paid enough attention to the relationship between 
“type of regime” and “level of volatility”.  Next, we present our empirical data and test some 
hypotheses, drawn from the theoretical literature. In the final section, we discuss the results of our 
analysis and outline the main findings. As noted above, our study focuses on electoral volatility 
during the Putin era, beginning with the first national elections which UR contested in December 
2003 and finishing with the most recent Duma elections in September 2016.  
 
Cross-Regional Variations in Voting for UR in Duma Elections, and Kremlin Candidates in 
Presidential Elections 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 there are fairly significant cross-regional variations 
in electoral support for UR in Duma and Kremlin candidates in presidential Elections. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here]   
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[Figure 2 about here]   
As has been demonstrated by many scholars, regions with a larger share of non-Russians 
and a larger share of rural inhabitants will exhibit higher levels of support for UR which, is a result 
of the more effective administrative mobilization of the electorate in these regions (Panov and 
Ross 2016, see also Moraski and Reisinger 2003; Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi 2016; Golosov 2013; 
White 2016).  
Moreover, a change in the levels of electoral support for UR in Duma elections across 
electoral cycles is also high. Voting for UR varied from a high of 64.3% in 2007 to a low of 37.4% 
in 2003. This has not been the case for presidential elections which exhibit a much lower level of 
volatility in support of Kremlin candidates, ranging from a high of 71.3% in 2004 to a low of 
63.5% in 2012. We would argue that the lower levels of electoral volatility in the presidential 
elections can be explained by the more personalized pattern of voting in these elections, the strong 
levels of citizen trust in the institution of the presidency, and the popular support for Putin (which 
was transferred to Medvedev in 2008). At the same time, the lower levels of volatility in 
presidential elections do not entail lower levels of cross-regional variations.  
For our study we use two sets of data: 1) UR’s regional results in four Duma elections 
(2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016) in 83 regions; 2) The regional results for UR-Kremlin candidates in 
three presidential elections (Putin’s victory in 2004 and 2012; Medvedev’s victory in 2008) in 83 
regions. Crimea and Sevastopol’, in addition to a small number of ethnic regions which were 
merged with other regions in the mid-2000s are excluded. On the basis of these data, we calculate 
the modulus of change in the share of votes gained by UR or UR-Kremlin candidates between two 
consecutive elections (volatUR). The total number of observations is as follows:  
1) volatUR_Duma – 3 sets of values for four consecutive Duma elections -  249 units of 
observation; 
2) volatUR_Pres – 2 sets of values for three presidential elections – 166 units of observation 
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In order to check cross-regional variations in volatility, we also calculate the average values 
of the volatility for every region in Duma elections (it is the sum of all three values of 
volatUR_Duma divided by 3) and in presidential elections (it is the sum of two values of 
volatUR_Pres divided by 2). These results are presented in Table 1; and the degrees of cross-
regional variation are displayed in Figure 3. It has to be stressed that although the level of volatility 
is much less in presidential elections than in Duma elections, the degrees of variation in volatility 
are almost the same in both types of election. 
[Figure 3 about here]   
As can be seen in Figure 4 there is no correlation between the average values of volatility 
in the Duma and presidential elections. The coefficient is negative (-0.115), and statistically 
insignificant. Consequently, there are significant cross-regional differences in the levels of 
volatility in these two types of election.   
[Figure 4 about here]   
Explaining Volatility 
Studies of electoral volatility have tested ‘three main groups of causal variables: economic 
changes, political institutions, and social cleavages’ (Madrid 2005, p. 2). We would argue that 
whilst these theories have been developed to explain the electoral volatility of ‘party systems’, 
they can equally, and very productively, be applied to the study of volatility in voting for a single 
party – namely UR.  
Aggregate economic voting. According to this approach ‘voters punish or reward 
incumbent parties and officeholders for their relative success in managing the economy’ (Roberts 
and Wibbels 1999).  Over the period 2000-7 there was strong growth in the Russian economy 
which averaged 4-7% per annum. However, in 2008 Russia began to feel the negative impact of 
the world economic crisis. Oil prices plummeted and the value of Russia’s exports fell. In 2009 
GDP fell to -7.8%, and over the period 2009-13 there was an average annual growth rate of just 
1.5% (Russia Economic Report, World Bank, 2017). In the wake of economic sanctions imposed 
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by the West, after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, there was a further steep decline in GDP 
which fell to 0.7% in 2014, -3.7% in 2015 and -1.2% in 2016 (Ibid). From the perspectives of this 
approach, support for UR should follow in step with changes in economic indicators; and this 
appears to be confirmed by the results for UR in the Duma elections (which rose from 37.5% in 
2003 to 64.3% in 2007 before falling to 49.2% in 2011, with a slight recovery to 54.2% in 2016). 
However, support for Kremlin candidates in presidential elections which is much higher than in 
the Duma elections (71.3% in 2004, 70.2% in 2008 and 65.5% in 2012), has not followed such a 
clear path in line with economic developments. At the same time, there are huge regional variations 
in the levels of economic performance. Our cross-regional comparisons will allow us to evaluate 
the relevance of aggregate economic voting on the volatility of support for UR. 
The structure of socio-political cleavages. From this perspective electoral volatility is 
linked ‘to the structure of socio-political cleavages and their degree of organizational closure’ 
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999). We would argue that this approach is less likely to be relevant to 
Russia, as political parties continue to have rather shallow roots in civil society and their support 
is not yet grounded in strong and stable social cleavages (see Korgunyuk 2015, Korgunyuk, Ross 
and Shpagin, 2017). Moreover, manipulation of the rules of the game by the Kremlin has made a 
major impact on the contours of the Russian party system (see discussion below) which has 
distorted the impact of socio-economic cleavages.   
However, there are two well-known social factors which have been shown to influence the 
levels of electoral support for UR, namely, ethnicity and urbanization. As a rule, regions with a 
lower share of ethnic Russians and a smaller number of urban residents will provide more votes 
for UR (Panov and Ross 2016). Thus, for instance, the ethnically defined “national republics” in 
Russia have much higher levels of electoral turnout and demonstrate greater levels of electoral 
support for the “party of power”, than voters in the territorially defined regions. For example, in 
the four Duma elections (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016), UR won the following sequence of votes 
in the Republic of Chechnya: 79.8%, 99.3%, 99.4% and 96.3%, and in the three presidential 
6
elections (2004, 2007 and 2012) the figures were; 92.3%, 88.7, and 99.7%. In the Republic of 
Mordoviya the corresponding figures were, for the Duma; 76.1%, 93.4%, 91.6%, 84.4%, and for 
the presidency; 91.3%, 90.3% and 86.9% (see Table 1). 
 However, it would clearly be absurd to define UR as a party of ‘non-Russians’ or a ‘rural’ 
political party. In Russia the impact of ethnic and rural cleavages on voting is not a direct 
relationship but rather is mediated by regime type. Thus, variations in the levels of support for UR 
need to be examined from a wider perspective which takes into account the nature of the regional 
regimes (which range from “competitive authoritarian” to “hegemonic” authoritarian), and the 
ability of their political machines to deliver the votes for UR.  
Institutional explanations. Two groups of institutional features have been posited to explain 
variations in volatility: 1) the type of electoral system: proportional or majoritarian; the size of the 
electoral threshold and district magnitude; and changes in electoral rules.  In Russia there have 
been many changes to the rules governing the electoral system. For elections to the Duma in 2003 
and 2016 there was a mixed system with half of the seats elected in first past the post, single 
member districts, and the other half elected in PR elections with a 5% threshold. In 2007 and 2011 
the SMD elections were abolished and the Duma was fully elected by a PR Party List system with 
a 7% threshold. Nevertheless, in both 2003 and 2016, Russia employed a ‘parallel’ sub-type of 
mixed electoral system, whereby the elections results are determined independently in both parts 
of the voting process. Because our study focuses only on the election results in the PR party list 
elections, our analysis will take into account changes to the Duma’s electoral system. This will 
allow us to deal with any ‘contamination effects’, emanating from the single mandate races, on 
our results (Herron and Nishikawa, 2001; Moser and Scheiner, 2004). 
2) The properties of the party system itself, such as ideological polarization, fragmentation, 
and institutionalization. (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). In polarized party systems ‘the ideological 
distances between parties will be greater and this should make it more difficult for voters to shift 
from one party to another’ (Dejaeghere and Dassonneville, 2012, p. 6). In contrast high degrees of 
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party system fragmentation will effect volatility in the opposite direction. More fragmented party 
systems facilitate volatility. However, if we examine the party system over the period 2003-2016, 
we find no significant changes in either the ideological distances between the parties or the levels 
of party system fragmentation. Firstly, the general configuration of the party system is similar over  
the whole period of our study: there is, 1) a dominant party of power – United Russia (which is 
statist and patriotic in its ideological orientations); 2) three “second order” parties, the so-called 
‘systemic opposition’ – left-wing Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsiya),  populist Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (Liberal’no Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii) and the ideologically ambivalent Just 
Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya); 3) some small parties such as Patriots of Russia (Patrioty Rossii), 
Yabloko (Rossiiskaya Ob’edinennaya Demokraticheskaya Partiya), Union of Right Forces (Soyuz 
Pravykh Sil), Right Cause (Pravo Delo), and many others which participate in elections, but never 
overcome the electoral thresholds. Secondly, in spite of the significant cross-regional differences 
in voting for UR this is not related to the levels of ideological polarization or party fragmentation. 
Even in those regions which deliver the lowest levels of electoral support for UR, the “party of 
power” still wins more votes than any of the other contestants. The minor parties are weak not 
only at the national level but also in all of the regions. Moreover, as Golosov has demonstrated, 
there are very high levels of party nationalization in the party-list contests (Golosov 2015). In other 
words, there are no substantial cross-regional variations in the general configuration of the party 
system in either the ideological or fragmentation dimensions. Consequently, for the purposes of 
our analysis these factors can therefore also be taken as constant, and thus can be omitted from our 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, volatility can be stimulated not only by higher levels of fragmentation, but 
also the number of party alternatives presented to a voter. Though the fragmentation of a party 
system and number of parties participating in an election correlate with each other, these are not 
identical features. Whilst fragmentation reflects to a greater extent the results of voting (‘demand 
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side’), the number of party alternatives concerns the range of choices presented to voters by elites 
(‘supply side’). Whilst much of the literature on volatility puts the blame on the volatile voters, 
Tavits, in her study of parties in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, demonstrates that, 
in fact, ‘electoral volatility responds to, rather than triggers, party schisms and elite level 
manipulations of supply’ (2008, p. 538). Moreover, as Birch notes, ‘Most countries in the Eastern 
European region have followed a far more ‘command economy’ style development in which the 
supply of parties has been based primarily on the whim of élites with little reference to the 
demands, desires, or preferences of the electorate’ (2003, p. 3) 
A greater number of parties provide the voter with more choice even if the fragmentation 
of party system is fairly low as in the Russian case. Thus, ‘we would expect there to be a linear 
relationship between the number of parties and electoral volatility’ (Dejaeghere and Dassonneville, 
2012, p. 6). In the Russian Federation legislative changes driven by the Kremlin concerning the 
rules governing the registration of parties and their participation in elections have led to a situation 
whereby their numbers have fluctuated widely. In 2003, 23 parties contested the Duma election, 
in 2007 this fell to 11, and there were 7 parties competing in 2011. Scores of new parties entered 
the electoral arena after new legislation was adopted in 2012 which made it much easier for parties 
to register with the Ministry of Justice. According to these amendments the number of party 
members required for registration was drastically reduced from 40,000 to 500, leading to the 
creation of over 70 parties by 2016. The number of parties contesting the 2016 Duma elections 
doubled from 7 in 2011 to 14. There has been far less variation in the number of candidates 
standing in presidential elections: there were 6 contenders in 2004, 4 in 2008, and 5 in 2012. 
In addition, changes to the rules on registering for elections adopted in 2012 stipulated that 
party list candidates no longer needed to submit nomination signatures, and the maximum number 
of signatures required by independent candidates was lowered from 2% to 0.5%.  In previous 
elections scores of opposition candidates and party lists were denied registration because the 
regional electoral commissions declared their nomination signatures invalid (see Ross 2011 and 
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2011a). These new election rules made it much easier for parties to register for elections. As a 
result of further changes to electoral legislation which were adopted in May 2014, the requirement 
of party list candidates to collect nomination signatures was reinstated, although the percentage of 
signatures required was lowered from 2% to 0.5% of the regional electorate, whilst for candidates 
in the single mandate elections, the number of required signatures was raised from 0.5 to 3%. Thus, 
in Russia the Kremlin’s manipulation of election and party rules has been an important factor in 
determining which parties and candidates can contest elections (see Kynev, 2017). 
The final feature of party systems is their degree of party system institutionalization. Highly 
institutionalized party systems ‘will discourage electoral volatility by closing off the electoral 
marketplace, narrowing the range of viable alternatives, and socializing voters to embrace 
established partisan identities’ (Roberts and Wibbels 1999, p. 578). Moreover, the age of the main 
parties will also have an impact on the degree of electoral volatility as ‘older parties are likely to 
have deeper, more stable roots in society than younger ones’ (Madrid 2005, p. 2). For UR, the 
critical period of its institutionalization was the period 2001-2007. By 2007 it had successfully 
penetrated the regions, and it was largely able to consolidate the key regional elites under its 
political umbrella. Consequently, we need to take the institutionalization variable into account 
only for the first electoral cycle (2003-2007), whilst for the following cycles (2007-2011 and 2011-
2016) this factor can be taken as a constant.  
Regime explanations. As noted above, we would stress that ‘regime type’ has a 
disproportionate influence in authoritarian regimes such as Russia. In this regard, Golosov makes 
the important point that economic growth or recession in authoritarian regimes may have a 
different impact than in democracies, where ‘volatility has been linked to the extent to which voters 
hold their governments responsible for economic outcomes. Therefore, economic decay can cause 
increased voter volatility’ (2016, p. 537). However, ruling parties in authoritarian regimes have 
been able ‘to monopolize mass support even in the conditions when the national economy 
deteriorates’ (Ibid). By tapping into their patronage networks and utilizing clientelistic forms of 
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exchange, which reward loyalty and punishes dissent, authoritarian regimes are able to ‘survive 
economic hardship by making it inconsequential for election results’ (Ibid, 539). Whilst Golosov 
has convincingly proved the validity of his argument in his large-N cross-country analysis, our 
study examines variations in the levels of volatility in just one country, the Russian Federation, 
which, as noted above, comprises different types of regional regimes. We hypothesize that 
volatility in the levels of support for UR will be lower in the most authoritarian regimes.  
Furthermore, the institutionalization argument can be expanded to the wider political 
system and the political regime in general. Regardless of the type of political regime, stability 
leads to lower levels of electoral volatility. Thus, for example, Golosov in his study of authoritarian 
regimes notes that, ‘Long-standing authoritarian regimes tend to create political settings in which 
all actors, including loyal quasi-opposition parties, tend to occupy stable – if not permanent – 
niches… thus, the stability of the political executive is negatively related to voter volatility’ (2016, 
p. 544). Following Golosov we hypothesize that the stability of regional governments (regional 
governors) will inhibit voter volatility in authoritarian regimes. 
Turnout. Electoral volatility will also depend on the stability of turnout. If we take, for 
example, a hypothetically ‘normal’ level of turnout, it is obvious that one part of the electorate will 
be members of the ‘core electorate’, whilst the other part will comprise the so called ‘swing voters’. 
If we suppose that ‘core voters’ usually participate in elections, a change in turnout, all else been 
equal, will primarily be connected with a rise in the number of ‘swing voters’. Consequently, this 
should be accompanied by a change in the levels of support for the parties. 
Variables and Analysis 
Our dependent variable is the modulus of change in the share of votes gained by UR or 
UR-Kremlin candidates between two consecutive elections (volatUR). The set of independent 
variables is drawn from the theories discussed above. 
For the examination of the economic explanations of volatility we employed the variable 
‘change in the level of poverty’ in the regions. The level of poverty is defined statistically as the 
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share the population with incomes below the subsistence minimum. We suggest that this indicator 
is much more accurate than the level of GDP per capita, or the average monthly salary, as the 
minimum cost of living (subsistence minimum) is defined by each subject of the Russian 
Federation separately, on the basis of the price of a local basket of standardized commodities. 
Thus, we calculated the modulus of change in the level of poverty between consecutive electoral 
cycles. 
The next three variables are included in accordance with institutional explanations. The 
first variable captures the change in electoral system. For the purpose of this study, we need not 
measure all the nuances in electoral rules; it is sufficient to examine how the change of electoral 
system influences the volatility of UR’s support. Therefore we use a very simple dichotomous 
variable that is assigned the value of ‘1’ in the cases of change in electoral system (in 2007 and 
2016 Duma elections) and ‘0’ for 2011 elections.  
The second variable examines ‘change in the level of UR’s institutionalization’. Since, as 
noted above, UR achieved a substantial degree of institutionalization by the time of the 2007 
elections, we assume that there will be no significant changes in the value of this variable for the 
2007-2011 and 2011-2016 cycles. Here, we also used a dichotomous variable that is assigned the 
value of ‘1’ for 2003-2007 cycle (it denotes change in the degree of UR’s institutionalization) and 
‘0’ for two other cycles (no change in the degree of UR’s institutionalization). 
The third variable concerns the number of party alternatives presented to a voter. This is 
based on the proposition that a change in the number of parties / candidates, increases volatility. 
Here we calculated the modulus of ‘change in the number of parties / candidates’, which 
participated in the elections. 
It should be stressed that the variables in this group, unlike all the other variables, measure 
differences between electoral cycles, not between regions. As we take national elections, regions 
cannot vary in the values of these indicators. However, since we include in the analysis data on 
volatility in some electoral cycles, we need these variables to control for cross-cycle differences. 
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Two other variables are related to the features of regional regimes. The first examines 
variation in the degree of authoritarianism. It is not easy to find a good indicator for the 
measurement of this variable. One of the most prominent indexes – Petrov and Titkov’s ‘expert 
ratings of democratization of Russian regions’ (Petrov and Titkov 2013) – is not appropriate for 
this study as it does not cover the complete time period. In addition, the methodology employed 
to calculate the degrees of democracy changed over time. For this reason, we have used the  
indicator, ‘share of votes UR or UR-Kremlin candidates’ obtain in the regions in the respective 
elections. These values have been weighted by national values because the values change between 
electoral cycles. It has to be stressed that weighted values differ to a sufficient degree from the 
absolute values; and this measurement allows us to avoid any proximity between the independent 
and dependent variables. We found no theoretical or empirical similarities, between, the variables, 
‘UR’s / UR-Kremlin candidates’ weighed share of votes, and change in the share of votes gained 
by UR or UR-Kremlin candidates between two consecutive elections’ (dependent variable). Thus, 
the correlation coefficient is fairly low and takes the values ‘-0.157’ and ‘-0.169’ in Duma and 
presidential elections respectively.  
Nevertheless, taking into account that the ‘share of votes UR or UR-Kremlin candidates’ 
is undoubtedly an approximate indicator, we need to subject it to a robust statistical check. Here 
we utilize the standard indicators - share of Russians and urban dwellers in the population of a 
region. As it was noted above, social cleavages theory is not relevant for the explanation of the 
volatility of UR support in Russian regions, but it has been argued that higher shares of non-
Russians and rural dwellers in the regions facilitate greater degrees of administrative and 
authoritarian control over the electorate.  It is therefore, not surprising that the shares of non-
Russians and rural dwellers in a region strongly correlates with voting for UR (the values of 
correlation coefficients are 0.708 and 0.511 respectively). Consequently, although these variables, 
as such, are not the indicators of the degree of authoritarianism, they can be considered as 
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‘facilitators of authoritarian rule’ and therefore may be used as substitutes for the ‘share of votes 
UR or UR-Kremlin candidates.’     
For the measurement of the stability of a regional regime we use as an approximation, the 
variable, a ‘change of governor’ in the period between consecutive elections. In the context of 
regional authoritarianism, where clientelistic exchanges between regional elites and citizens are 
the norm, we would surmise that a change of governor will have a destabilizing effect on a regional 
regime. That is why we include a dichotomous variable which is assigned the value of ‘1’, if a 
governor was changed between electoral cycles, and ‘0’, if there was no replacement of a governor.  
Finally, taking into account the fact that turnout can influence volatility, ‘change in turnout’ 
is considered as a control variable. Here, we calculated the modulus of change in turnout rates 
between consecutive elections. 
All the independent variables and sources of the data are summarized in Table 2.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Hypothesis 
1. Higher rates of change in the in the level of poverty in the regions will increase the levels of 
volatility for UR / UR-Kremlin candidates.  
2. Change in electoral system will increase the levels of volatility for UR / UR-Kremlin 
candidates. 
3. Substantial change in the degree of UR’s institutionalization will increase the levels of 
volatility for UR / UR-Kremlin candidates. 
4. Change in number of parties / candidates participating in elections will increase the levels of 
volatility for UR / UR-Kremlin candidates. 
5. In more authoritarian regimes the value of volatility will be lower.  
6. The more stable the political situation in a region the lower the value of volatility for UR / 
UR-Kremlin candidates. 
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7. Higher changes in turnout increase the levels of volatility of support for UR / UR-Kremlin 
candidates. 
Since our statistics are a type of panel data (3 time series values of volatUR_Duma and 2 
time series values of volatUR_Pres across 83 regions), we use linear mixed modelling. For this 
study, the fixed effects model is likely to be more appropriate in comparison to the random effects 
model, as all the regions of the Russian Federation are included in the sample so that the selection 
cannot be regarded as random. Each region has its own unique features; and the effects specific to 
the unit of analysis are correlated with the independent variables. The results of the fixed effects 
models are presented in Tables 3-5.  
For the analysis we use several models. As it was noted above, we need a robust check for 
the measurement of the degree of authoritarianism through the variable URvote. For that purpose, 
the shares of Russians and urban dwellers are used, therefore additional models for each of these 
are required. Furthermore, since ‘Change Number of Parties’ correlates with ’Change Electoral 
System’ and ‘Change UR Institutionalization’ to a great extent (in both cases Spearman coefficient 
= 0.866), we include these variables in the separate models in order to avoid multicollinearity. 
That explains why we develop 6 different models as presented in Table 3. Model 1-3 include 
‘Change Number of Parties’ while models 4-6 include both ‘Change UR Institutionalization’ and 
’Change Electoral System’. 
[Tables 3 about here] 
The analysis confirms some of our hypothesis. According to our theoretical expectations, 
both ‘economic’ and ‘type of regime’ predictors clearly influence on the volatility of UR’s support 
in Russian regions. Volatility increases as the ‘change in poverty’ rises. More authoritarian 
regimes will have lower levels of volatility for UR. Also, a change in number of parties 
participating in the elections entails volatility in voting for UR. Finally, change in the degree of 
institutionalization of UR facilitates volatility.  
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It has to be noted that the influence of Change in Poverty, Number of parties, and Degree 
of Institutionalization of the Volatility of UR’s support remains the same, even if we replace the 
variable ‘Voting for UR’ by ‘Share of Russians’ or ‘Share of Urban population’. Consequently, 
this proves the veracity of our results. Although it has to be noted, that while ‘Share of Russians’ 
has a statistically significant coefficient, the ‘Share of Urban population’ does not.   
At the same time, the analysis demonstrates that changes in electoral system, which took 
place in the 2007 and 2016 Duma elections, does not increase volatility. On the contrary, volatility 
reduces. This unexpected result can be explained by the fact that in both cases UR changed the 
electoral rules clearly to its own benefit. Next, contrary to our expectation, the regional regime 
stability variable (‘Change Governor’) had persistently statistically insignificant coefficients. This 
means, that in the context of Putin’s ‘power vertical’, in most cases a change of a governor, does 
not destabilize the regional regime to such a degree that that the regional political machine is not 
able deliver a majority of the votes for  UR. Furthermore, even if regional elite groups are 
restructured in the context of the appointment of a new governor, when it comes to federal 
elections, they will usually forget their internal conflicts and solidify their support for UR. Finally, 
the coefficients for the values of the variable ‘Change Turnout’ are unstable which means that our 
expectation concerning the influence of turnout on UR’s volatility is not proved.  
Although two of the three predictors of the ‘degree of authoritarianism’ (the direct measure 
URvote and ‘authoritarianism facilitator’ ShareRus) have very high and statistically significant 
coefficients, it may be the case that the high value for these variables may be distorted by the 
influence of the group of regions which can be classified as ‘hegemonic authoritarian’ – the 10 
‘national republics’ (Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Chukotka, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kabardino-
Balkariya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Mordoviya, Tatarstan, Tuva) and Kemerovo oblast’. These 
regions usually produce much higher than average levels of support for UR. In order to test, to 
what extent this group of regions distorted the results in models 1-6, they are excluded from the 
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analysis in models 7-12. Such modification and the juxtaposition of these models allows us to 
make the second robust test of our results.  
[Tables 4 about here] 
Here we find that the changes to the original set of units of observation do not substantially 
change the results. Economic factors remain important, with the exception of Models 10-12 where 
‘Change Poverty’ lost its statistical significance. The influence of the type of regional regime, 
change in number of parties, change in the degree of UR’s institutionalization also has similar 
coefficients. As in models 1-6, the coefficients of the variable of ‘Change in Turnout’ are unstable; 
also those for ‘Change Governor’ are statistically insignificant. Again, we found that changes in 
the electoral system influenced the volatility of UR’s support in the opposite direction to our 
expectations from the theoretical literature. Thus, we can conclude that our results are fairly robust. 
Finally, we juxtapose the results of the analysis of Duma elections with presidential 
elections. For the analysis of volatility of support for UR-Kremlin candidates in presidential 
elections, it is possible to use the same data as for the Duma elections, since the distances in time 
between the 2003, 2007, and 2011 Duma elections, and the 2004, 2008 and 2012 presidential 
elections are very short (a few months). Two variables – ‘Change in UR Institutionalization’ and 
‘Change in Electoral System’ – are not applicable for the analysis of presidential elections, since 
the first doesn’t directly concern Presidents, and the presidential electoral system was basically 
unchanged over the period of our study. For that reason in Models 13-15, the same set of predictors 
as in Models 1-3 was included, and we can compare Models 13-15 with Models 1-3. In a similar 
vein, we use Models 16-18 which excludes the 11 most authoritarian regions, thus allowing a 
comparison with Models 7-9.  
[Tables 5 about here] 
Looking at the results of our analysis of the presidential elections, we find, first of all, that 
the values of the coefficients of the economic regressor (Change Poverty) lose their significance, 
whereas ‘Turnout’ becomes a significant predictor, having positive coefficients, which accords 
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with our expectations. On the contrary, ‘Candidates number’ saves its importance but changes its 
sign which contradicts our theoretical expectations. Regional regime stability predictors (Governor 
Change) are once again not significant. The only variable that stays the same is ‘Authoritarianism’. 
Conclusion  
The main finding of our study is that “regime-type” or more precisely “authoritarianism” is the 
key explanatory variable. Authoritarianism remains significant over most of our models which 
confirms our hypothesis. This conclusion is in line with the results of Golosov’s (2016) cross-
national study of electoral volatility. Stronger authoritarian rulers are able to control regional elites 
and ensure the best results for UR and its candidates by exerting administrative pressure on the 
voters. This reduces the level of volatility in voting for UR and its candidates. Softer regional 
regimes are characterized by greater degrees of intra-elite competitiveness that results in weaker 
administrative pressure. In this context, voting for UR and its candidates become more susceptible 
to the influence of various external factors, and this leads to an increase in the volatility of support 
for UR. 
Another interesting finding of our study is that stability of the executive (regional 
governors) is not an important factor for volatility, in either the Duma or presidential elections. It 
does not have a significant coefficient in any of the models. At first glance, this would appear to 
be contrary to Golosov’s (2016) findings, however, his study entails a large-N cross-country 
comparison of party systems, whilst we compare regional variations in volatility within just one 
country, and for a single party. It appears that in the context of the Kremlin’s ‘power vertical’, a 
change of governor does not prevent regional machines from “bringing home the votes” for UR, 
which is perceived as a litmus test of a region’s loyalty to the Kremlin, and this factor explains 
why the stability variables in our study are not significant. 
Our study produces convincing evidence that there are substantial differences between the 
Duma and presidential elections. First of all, we find a clear trend in the levels of volatility for UR 
in the Duma elections which see a steady fall over the period of the study (see Table 6). However, 
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this is not the case for presidential elections, although we have to take into account the fact that 
the level of volatility in presidential elections is fairly low, so that it would be wrong to make any 
firm conclusions about clear trends.  
[Table 6 about here]  
However, we would draw attention to the relatively low level of volatility as such, which 
shows that voting in presidential elections differs from Duma elections. It has to be said, that 
Russian presidential elections are perceived by many citizens through a ‘personal prism.’ As a 
result, Putin who is very popular, and in 2008 – his handpicked successor, Medvedev, have 
consistently won many more votes than the “party of power”. Furthermore, our results show that 
in presidential elections the economic explanation for volatility does not count. This is because in 
Russia most voters have not considered the candidate’s economic records to be the most important 
factor. Additionally, a change in the number of candidates influences volatility in the opposite 
direction to our theoretical expectations. This can be explained by the fact that opposition 
candidates have not been considered by a majority of voters as viable alternatives to Putin or 
Medvedev. Both of these findings correspond with the thesis that presidential elections in Russia 
may be considered more as referendums on the personal characteristics of the candidates, than a 
judgment on the policies and economic performance of UR.   
In this sense, Duma elections demonstrate very different results. We find that economic 
factors and the number of competing parties matter. Consequently, both economic and institutional 
explanations of volatility have significance, at least partially, in Duma elections, in contrast to 
presidential elections. This would suggest that in Duma elections UR is perceived by the electorate 
as a ruling party which is responsible for economic policy. Consequently, we find a positive 
relationship between changes in social and economic conditions and volatility in voting for UR. 
These essential differences between the Duma and presidential elections explain the lack of 
correlation between the average values of volatility in Duma and presidential elections, which is 
displayed in Figure 2. Nevertheless, the positive relationship between a change in the social and 
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economic conditions and volatility in voting for UR, is obscured by the high levels of mobilization 
of the electorate in authoritarian regimes. In other words, in Russia, “regime type” is a better 
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of UR-Kremlin  
candidates on  
Pres. elections 
National Results 37.40 64.30 49.32 54.20 71.31 70.28 63.53   
1. Adygeya         51.30 70.97 60.21 59.45 76.42 69.77 64.04 0.1040 0.0619 
2. Altay krai      29.60 54.69 37.17 35.20 67.64 60.35 57.33 0.1486 0.0516 
3. Altay rep.       26.40 69.46 53.33 48.81 75.03 73.82 66.85 0.2124 0.0409 
4. Amur       32.30 69.75 43.53 37.90 64.87 63.62 62.80 0.2310 0.0104 
5. Archangelsk     37.90 56.72 31.90 44.50 77.45 66.98 57.92 0.1875 0.0977 
6. Astrakhan       31.70 58.01 60.17 42.20 66.08 75.28 68.65 0.1548 0.0792 
7. Bashkortostan   38.90 83.12 70.50 56.40 91.78 88.01 75.22 0.2365 0.0828 
8. Belgorod        33.10 65.39 51.16 54.70 54.82 68.96 59.30 0.1669 0.1190 
9. Bryansk         34.70 61.77 50.12 63.90 63.57 61.82 63.89 0.1750 0.0191 
10. Buryatiya        34.70 65.59 49.02 43.34 66.58 70.84 66.18 0.1771 0.0446 
11. Chechnya 79.80 99.36 99.48 96.30 92.30 88.70 99.76 0.0762 0.0733 
12. Chelyabinsk     33.80 61.11 50.28 38.20 70.18 65.63 64.94 0.1674 0.0262 
13. Chukotka   54.40 78.13 70.32 58.80 87.24 81.41 72.40 0.1435 0.0742 
14. Chuvashiya      37.30 62.27 43.42 50.90 67.12 66.48 62.31 0.1710 0.0241 
15. Dagestan        65.90 89.19 91.44 88.90 94.61 91.92 92.82 0.0936 0.0180 
16. Ingushetiya      57.00 98.72 90.96 72.41 98.18 91.66 91.91 0.2268 0.0339 
17. Irkutsk         32.80 58.69 34.93 39.80 61.96 61.24 55.43 0.1817 0.0327 
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18. Ivanovo         33.60 60.76 40.12 42.40 67.21 64.92 61.77 0.1669 0.0272 
19. Jewish AO      42.20 66.22 48.11 45.00 67.87 67.39 61.59 0.1508 0.0314 
20. Kabardino-Balkariya    
77.00 96.12 81.91 77.71 96.49 88.80 77.63 
0.1251 
0.0943 
21. Kaliningrad     32.00 57.38 37.07 43.40 69.86 62.09 52.53 0.1734 0.0867 
22. Kalmykiya        50.70 72.70 66.10 70.60 79.23 71.56 70.28 0.1103 0.0448 
23. Kaluga          35.10 61.65 40.42 45.70 70.16 65.54 58.99 0.1769 0.0559 
24. Kamchatka    35.00 68.35 45.25 46.70 71.82 69.39 59.82 0.1930 0.0600 
25. Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 49.60 92.90 89.84 81.70 82.28 90.35 91.36 0.1817 0.0454 
26. Kareliya         37.90 57.28 32.26 37.30 74.14 67.25 55.36 0.1648 0.0939 
27. Kemerovo        52.10 76.86 64.24 77.30 71.51 70.51 77.12 0.1681 0.0381 
28. Khabarovsk      34.30 60.67 38.14 37.30 64.52 64.12 56.13 0.1658 0.0420 
29. Khakasiya        30.40 59.53 40.13 38.10 61.41 60.47 58.36 0.1685 0.0153 
30. Khanty-Mansi AO   41.30 65.95 41.01 47.60 74.84 66.68 66.39 0.1873 0.0423 
31. Kirov           32.90 55.38 34.90 38.00 65.52 76.29 57.90 0.1535 0.1458 
32. Komi 33.00 62.06 58.81 37.80 73.59 71.74 64.93 0.1777 0.0433 
33. Kostroma        34.10 56.35 30.74 36.60 69.22 62.44 52.76 0.1791 0.0823 
34. Krasnodar       37.10 61.89 56.15 59.30 67.37 75.06 63.66 0.1123 0.0955 
35. Krasnoyarsk     29.90 60.67 36.70 40.40 60.31 62.47 60.10 0.1948 0.0227 
36. Kurgan          33.60 64.43 44.41 41.50 66.94 64.93 63.37 0.1792 0.0179 
37. Kursk           30.10 62.74 45.72 51.70 65.24 64.27 60.43 0.1855 0.0241 
38. Leningrad Oblast 38.10 59.23 33.54 50.00 77.10 70.19 61.85 0.2109 0.0763 
39. Lipetsk        28.20 62.30 40.09 56.20 63.62 65.84 60.99 0.2414 0.0354 
40. Magadan         34.40 55.24 41.04 44.70 70.05 63.07 56.22 0.1290 0.0692 
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41. Marii El         34.60 67.54 52.24 46.70 67.30 77.22 59.96 0.1793 0.1359 
42. Mordoviya        76.10 93.41 91.62 84.40 91.35 90.31 86.99 0.0877 0.0218 
43. Moscow          34.10 54.15 46.62 37.80 68.61 71.52 46.76 0.1213 0.1384 
44. Moscow Oblast     33.60 59.76 33.10 46.00 71.12 70.41 56.73 0.2191 0.0720 
45. Murmansk        39.20 55.11 32.02 42.00 74.04 65.26 59.85 0.1633 0.0710 
46. Nenets AO   38.70 48.78 36.04 41.10 76.90 61.54 57.04 0.0929 0.0993 
47. Nizhegorod Oblast       32.00 60.63 44.55 58.10 65.88 61.84 63.77 0.1942 0.0299 
48. North Ossetiya    46.70 71.78 67.90 67.10 91.25 73.35 69.97 0.0992 0.1064 
49. Novgorod        37.10 63.13 34.58 40.10 71.74 65.81 57.88 0.2003 0.0693 
50. Novosibirsk     28.90 59.07 33.84 38.30 63.10 61.90 56.31 0.1995 0.0340 
51. Omsk            32.70 60.14 39.61 36.30 67.03 63.04 55.50 0.1709 0.0577 
52. Orenburg        27.60 60.31 34.89 40.90 58.79 60.81 56.88 0.2138 0.0298 
53. Oryol            44.60 59.85 38.99 47.90 61.66 66.38 52.82 0.1501 0.0914 
54. Penza           45.10 70.31 56.30 64.30 64.56 71.40 64.26 0.1574 0.0699 
55. Perm            30.70 62.06 36.28 42.70 72.75 67.30 62.92 0.2119 0.0492 
56. Primorsky krai      27.50 54.87 32.99 39.00 59.37 63.84 57.07 0.1842 0.0562 
57. Pskov           37.10 56.73 36.65 45.10 70.79 70.16 59.63 0.1605 0.0558 
58. Rostov          39.00 71.90 50.22 58.80 72.49 76.94 62.61 0.2105 0.0939 
59. Ryazan          31.70 57.10 39.79 54.50 73.22 60.82 59.70 0.1914 0.0676 
60. Sakhalin        30.10 62.96 41.91 45.40 68.41 63.52 56.28 0.1913 0.0607 
61. Samara          32.60 56.08 39.37 50.80 63.28 64.08 58.53 0.1721 0.0318 
62. Saratov         44.30 64.81 64.89 68.20 70.79 75.62 70.50 0.0797 0.0498 
63. Smolensk        37.30 53.92 36.23 48.10 64.91 59.26 56.68 0.1539 0.0412 
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64. St Petersburg 31.80 50.33 35.35 39.70 75.12 72.27 58.56 0.1262 0.0828 
65. Stavropol       32.00 62.20 49.11 54.30 64.54 64.79 64.43 0.1616 0.0031 
66. Sverdlovsk Oblast       34.10 62.04 32.71 40.50 76.34 68.98 64.48 0.2169 0.0593 
67. Tambov          29.00 59.79 66.66 63.50 63.62 72.51 71.65 0.1361 0.0488 
68. Tatarstan       59.50 81.07 77.83 85.30 82.58 79.24 82.67 0.1076 0.0339 
69. Tomsk           34.00 58.41 37.51 40.70 67.15 64.12 57.05 0.1617 0.0505 
70. Tula            29.90 61.72 61.32 53.00 65.50 67.80 67.68 0.1351 0.0121 
71. Tuva            66.80 89.00 85.29 82.60 87.53 89.32 89.99 0.0953 0.0123 
72. Tver            34.50 59.71 38.44 45.00 70.59 67.57 57.99 0.1768 0.0630 
73. Tyumen           49.70 73.57 62.21 58.40 73.59 78.88 73.04 0.1301 0.0557 
74. Udmurtiya        42.10 60.57 45.09 50.50 75.97 70.46 65.74 0.1312 0.0512 
75. Ulyanovsk       34.00 66.24 43.56 48.50 65.91 66.93 58.15 0.1995 0.0490 
76. Vladimir        30.40 56.75 38.27 45.20 68.83 64.05 53.47 0.1725 0.0768 
77. Volgograd       28.90 57.74 35.48 50.60 63.03 62.27 63.37 0.2207 0.0093 
78. Vologda         38.90 60.47 33.40 37.20 75.77 68.64 59.39 0.1748 0.0819 
79. Voronezh        25.90 56.97 50.05 58.70 65.28 66.27 61.31 0.1555 0.0298 
80. Yakutiya          38.90 63.99 49.16 46.40 69.76 67.78 69.41 0.1423 0.0181 
81. Yamalo-Nenets AO  45.80 79.35 71.68 67.10 84.50 83.86 84.50 0.1527 0.0064 
82. Yaroslavl       35.60 53.17 29.04 38.40 70.81 63.58 54.48 0.1702 0.0817 
83. Zabaikal’skii krai           38.10 62.75 43.28 39.90 72.49 65.81 65.64 0.1583 0.0343 
Source: Official website of the Central Election Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 21 March 2017). 
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Figure 1: Cross-regional variation in support for UR in Duma elections 
 
Figure 2. Cross-regional variation in support for Kremlin candidates in presidential elections 
 





Figure 4. The correlation between average values of volatility in Duma and presidential elections 




Table 2. Independent variables 
Variables  Name  Sources  
Change in the level of poverty 
Modulus of change in share of the 
population with incomes below the 
subsistence minimum between two 
consecutive elections  
Change Poverty Calculated by the authors on the basis of:  
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie 
Pokazateli 2010 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2010). 
Table 5.11; Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016 (Moskva: 
Rosstat, 2016). Table 4.16 
Change in electoral system 
Dichotomous variable (0 = no 
changes; 1 = changes) 
Change Electoral 
System 
2007 = ‘1’ 
2011 = ‘0’ 
2016 = ‘1’ 
Change in the level of UR’s 
institutionalization 
Dichotomous variable (0 = no 
changes; 1 = changes)   
Change UR 
Institutionalization 
2007 = ‘1’ 
2011 = ‘0’ 
2016 = ‘0’ 
Change in number of parties / 
candidates  
Modulus of change in the number of 
parties, which participate in 
elections, between two consecutive 
elections  
Change Number of 
Parties / Candidates 
Compiled from the information provided 
on the Russian Central Electoral 
Commission Website (http://www.cikf.ru). 
Degree of authoritarianism  
Share of votes UR or UR-Kremlin 
candidates obtain in the respective 
elections (weighted by national 
values) 
URvote Calculated by the authors from the 
information provided on the Russian 
Central Electoral Commission Website 
(http://www.cikf.ru). 
Facilitator  of authoritarianism-1  
Share of Russians in the population 
of a region 
RusShare Vserossiiskaya Perepis’ Naseleniya 2010. 
Table ‘National composition of the RF 
population’, available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perep
is2010/perepis_itogi1612.htm, accessed 8 
December, 2017. 
Facilitator  of authoritarianism-2  
Share of urban population in the 
regions in the year of elections. 
Since the values change, it has been 
weighted by national values 
UrbanShare Calculated by the authors on the basis of:  
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie 
Pokazateli 2010 (Moskva: Rosstat, 2010). 
Table 3.3; Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-
ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016 (Moskva: 
Rosstat, 2016). Table 2.3 
Change of governor  
Stability of tenure of a governor 
during the electoral cycle before the 
elections - dichotomous variable (0 
= no change; 1 = governor changed)  
Change Governor  Calculated by the authors 
Change in turnout  
Modulus of change in turnout 
between two consecutive elections 
Change Turnout Calculated by the authors from the 
information provided on the Russian 





Table 3. Fixed effect models: Duma elections (all cases) 































































  -0.101*** 
(0.015) 
  
RusShare  0.035* 
(0.019) 
  0.034** 
(0.016) 
   
UrbanShare   0,030 
(0,027) 
  0.010 
(0.023) 
Change Number of 







   
Change UR 
Institutionalization 












AIC -522.100 -500.715 -499.480 -657.004 -643.939 -640.742 
N 249 249 249 249 249 249 








Table 4. Fixed effect models: Duma elections (without the most authoritarian regions) 































































  -0.156*** 
(0.022) 
  
RusShare  0.041 
(0.030) 
  0.042** 
(0.021) 
  
UrbanShare   0.013 
(0.034) 
  0.001 
(0.024) 
Change Number of 







   
Change UR 
Institutionalization 












AIC -467.358 -438.276 -436.783 -600.372 -590.949 -587.481 
N 216 216 216 216 216 216 





Table 5. Fixed effect models: Presidential elections 





























































Change Number of 















  -0.056** 
(0.023) 
  
RusShare  0.008 
(0.014) 
  -0.003 
(0.020) 
  
UrbanShare   0.024 
(0.020) 
  0.021 
(0.023) 
AIC -547.097 -540.793 -542.641 -471.424 -465.492 -466.502 
N 166 166 166 144 144 144 






Table 6. Volatility of UR’s share of the votes: national and regional levels (summed) 
 2007 to 2003 2011 to 2007 2016 to 2011 
Volatility of UR’s share of the vote in Duma 
elections: national results 
0.2673 0.1501 0.0491 
Volatility of UR’s share of the vote in Duma 
elections: summing values of volatility in the 
regions (sum of all regions) 
21.8444 13.4209 5.7737 
 2008 to 2004 2012 to 2008  
Volatility of UR’s share of the vote in 
presidential elections: national results 
0.0103 0.0675  
Volatility of UR’s share of the vote in 
presidential elections: aggregate values of 
volatility in the regions (sum of all regions) 
3.9506 5.1899  
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